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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal lies at the confluence of intellectual 
property and antitrust law.  Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), we 
are tasked with balancing a patent owner’s right to exclude 
and the public’s right to benefit from fair and open 
competition. 
 
 The Appellants in this case are the direct and indirect 
purchasers of Wellbutrin XL, a drug designed to treat 
depression.  (Consolidated Brief of Appellees/Cross-
Appellants (“Ans. Br.”) 6, 19.)  The direct-purchaser 
Appellants bring claims under federal antitrust law, alleging 
that the Appellee, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”),1 violated 
Sections One and Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act by 
entering into an unlawful conspiracy with a company called 
Biovail,2 GSK’s partner in the development of Wellbutrin 
XL, to delay the launch of generic versions of the drug.  
(Consolidated Brief of Direct Purchaser and End-Payor Class 
                                              
1 “GlaxoSmithKline,” or “GSK,” refers collectively to 
SmithKline Beecham Corporation and GlaxoSmithKline 
PLC, the producers and distributors of Wellbutrin XL. 
 
2 “Biovail” refers collectively to Biovail Corporation 
(n/k/a Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.) and 
Biovail Laboratories International SRL (n/k/a Valeant 
International Bermuda).  Biovail was originally a defendant in 
the case but settled with the Appellants prior to the appeal.   
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Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Op. Br.”) 2; JA 11465-68.)  The 
indirect-purchaser Appellants assert similar theories, but 
under state, rather than federal law.  They also allege that 
GSK’s actions violated common law principles and state 
statutes mandating fair trade practices.   
 
According to the Appellants, GSK is liable under two 
theories.  First, the Appellants claim that GSK delayed the 
launch of generic versions of Wellbutrin XL by supporting 
baseless patent infringement suits and a baseless FDA Citizen 
Petition aimed at generic drug companies.  Second, they 
claim that GSK delayed the launch of those generic drugs by 
entering into an unlawful reverse payment settlement 
agreement with its potential competitors.3  The District Court 
granted summary judgment on the merits to GSK with respect 
to both of those theories.  It concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence that GSK’s patent litigation was a sham 
or that the settlement delayed the launch of generic versions 
of Wellbutrin XL.  At the same time, the Court granted 
GSK’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of the 
Appellants’ economic expert.  The Court also granted a 
motion to decertify the indirect-purchaser class for lack of 
                                              
3 Ordinarily, when a plaintiff sues a defendant, one 
expects that, if there is a settlement, it will involve a payment 
from the defendant to the plaintiff.  A so-called “reverse 
payment” settlement takes place when the plaintiff settles the 
case by paying the defendant.  See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (“Because the settlement requires 
the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other 
way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called 
a ‘reverse payment’ settlement agreement.”). 
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ascertainability and dismissed the indirect-purchaser claims 
brought under the laws of any state that was not the home of a 
named class representative.4  Finally, the Court denied a 
motion filed by Aetna, Inc. to intervene on the side of the 
indirect purchasers.5   
                                              
4 The District Court had certified both the direct-
purchaser and indirect-purchaser classes in August 2011.  The 
indirect purchasers allege antitrust claims under the laws of 
Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.  They assert 
violations of consumer protection laws in Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington 
and West Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia.  The 
District Court concluded that the indirect-purchaser 
Appellants only have standing to bring their claims under the 
laws of states where their members reside – that is, 
California, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.   
 
5 Aetna, an insurance provider, had purchased brand 
and generic versions of Wellbutrin XL in all 50 states.  It 
sought to intervene in order to save the indirect purchasers’ 
claims from dismissal. 
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This appeal followed.  Both the direct-purchaser and 
indirect-purchaser Appellants seek review of the District 
Court’s summary judgment and Daubert rulings.  The 
indirect-purchaser Appellants also contest the order 
decertifying their class and the denial of Aetna’s motion to 
intervene.  GSK filed a conditional cross-appeal challenging 
on numerosity grounds the certification of the direct-
purchaser class.  GSK filed a second conditional cross-appeal 
with respect to the indirect-purchaser class, asking that, if we 
were to disagree with the District Court’s decertification on 
ascertainability grounds, we nevertheless affirm on 
numerosity grounds.  The direct-purchaser and indirect-
purchaser Appellants filed a joint brief addressing the 
summary judgment orders and the order denying Aetna’s 
intervention; the indirect-purchaser Appellants also filed a 
separate brief addressing the decertification order. 
 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusions that the 
Appellants have failed to establish a genuine dispute of fact 
either as to whether GSK engaged in sham litigation or 
whether GSK’s actions delayed the launch of any generic 
version of Wellbutrin XL.  Consequently, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment and do not reach 
the remaining issues on appeal. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
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To better explain the antitrust issues in this case, we 
first describe the regulatory scheme that governs the testing 
and approval of new drugs in the United States.  That 
framework was established by the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585, as 
amended, which is commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act (“the Act”), or simply Hatch-Waxman.  Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2227-28. 
 
 A drug manufacturer seeking to market a new drug 
“must submit a New Drug Application [(NDA)] to the federal 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ... and undergo a long, 
comprehensive, and costly testing process, after which, if 
successful, the manufacturer will receive marketing approval 
from the FDA.”  Id. at 2228 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)).  
One of the goals of Hatch-Waxman is to increase competition 
between generic and brand-name drugs.  To that end, the Act 
allows the manufacturers of generic drugs to obtain FDA 
approval without having to endure the gauntlet of procedures 
associated with NDAs. 
 
[O]nce the FDA has approved a brand-name 
drug ... a manufacturer of a generic drug can 
obtain similar marketing approval through the 
use of abbreviated procedures.  The [Act] 
permits a generic manufacturer to file an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application [(ANDA)] 
specifying that the generic has the “same active 
ingredients as,” and is “biologically equivalent” 
to, the already-approved brand-name drug. ... 
[B]y allowing the generic to piggy-back on the 
pioneer’s approval efforts, [the Act] “speed[s] 
16 
 
the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to 
market,” thereby furthering drug competition. 
 
Id. (last alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 
U.S. 399, 405 (2012)). 
 
 In addition to streamlining the drug approval process, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act provides specialized procedures for 
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers to resolve 
intellectual property disputes.  The Act “requires the ... brand-
name manufacturer to list in its [NDA] the number and the 
expiration date of any relevant patent.  And it requires the 
generic manufacturer in its [ANDA] to assure the FDA that 
the generic will not infringe the brand-name’s patents.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  One way for 
generic manufacturers to make that assurance is to “certify 
that any listed, relevant patent ‘is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale’ of the drug 
described in the [ANDA].”  Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)).  That assurance is referred to as a 
paragraph IV certification.  Id.  To facilitate the filing of 
infringement suits, a paragraph IV certification 
“automatically counts as patent infringement.”6  Id. (citation 
                                              
6 The “infringement” in those circumstances is a legal 
construct that permits a patent holder to initiate suit without 
having to wait for the generic manufacturer to actually make, 
use, or sell a generic version of the patented drug.  Eli Lilly & 
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990) (explaining 
that “the defined act of infringement [is] artificial” and exists 
to “enable the judicial adjudication upon which the ANDA ... 
scheme[] depend[s]”).  Because a paragraph IV certification 
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omitted).  Hatch-Waxman further states that “[i]t shall be an 
act of infringement to submit an [ANDA] for a drug claimed 
in a patent[.]”  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
 
The Act also encourages brand-name manufacturers to 
file patent infringement suits quickly.  If a patentee files an 
infringement suit against a generic manufacturer within 45 
days of receiving notice of the filing of a paragraph IV 
certification, the patentee is rewarded with some breathing 
space before competition can begin: the FDA is required to 
withhold approval of the generic drug for 30 months or until 
the infringement case is resolved, whichever comes first.  21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 
Finally, the Act “provides a special incentive for a 
generic to be the first to file an [ANDA] taking the paragraph 
IV route.”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228-29.  The first applicant 
is entitled to an exclusivity period during which no generic 
drug other than the first-filer’s can compete with the brand-
name drug.  More specifically, the Act prohibits the FDA 
from approving any ANDA other than the one first filed until 
180 days after the first-filer starts marketing its drug.  
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  In effect, that allows the first-
filing generic to exclude other generics from the market for 
                                                                                                     
is defined as a technical act of infringement, it allows a patent 
owner to sue, but it does not speak to whether the disclosed 
generic drug does, in fact, infringe the cited patent.  Glaxo, 
Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“The occurrence of the defined ‘act of infringement’ 
does not determine the ultimate question whether what will be 
sold will infringe any relevant patent.”). 
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longer than 180 days because it may delay or decline to 
launch its drug.7 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
In 1985, GSK obtained FDA approval for bupropion 
hydrochloride, a drug for the treatment of major depressive 
disorders.  The drug became branded as “Wellbutrin.”  Over 
the years, several companies, including GSK, sought to 
develop an extended release formulation of bupropion 
hydrochloride.  While GSK was unsuccessful, at least two 
companies – Biovail and Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC – 
found success and obtained patents covering extended release 
                                              
7 While the exclusivity period can be forfeited if the 
first-filer fails to market its drug, it can take time to trigger 
the forfeiture.  “Forfeiture applies only upon the satisfaction 
of two statutory conditions.  The first condition [(i.e., the 
failure to market the drug either within 75 days of the date the 
ANDA was approved or within 30 months of the date the 
ANDA was submitted, whichever comes earlier)] is relatively 
easy to satisfy.  The second is triggered only if an appeals 
court rules that the relevant patents are invalid or not 
infringed, or if a settlement reaches a similar result.”  C. Scott 
Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New 
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 660-61 (2009) (footnotes omitted).  That 
rule “allows first-filers to retain their exclusivity by settling.”  
Chika Seidel, Comment, Settlement Should be the End of 
Story: A Proposed Procedure to Settle Hatch-Waxman 
Paragraph IV Litigations Modeled After Rule 23 Class Action 
Settlement Procedure, 46 Seton Hall L. Rev. 697, 706-07 
(2016) (footnote omitted). 
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formulations of the drug.8  To gain access to an extended 
release formulation, GSK obtained an exclusive license to 
certain of Biovail’s patents.  Then, in August 2002, GSK filed 
an NDA for that new formulation, which was approved the 
following year.  The extended release Wellbutrin was named 
“Wellbutrin XL.” 
 
 Between September 2004 and May 2005, four generic 
manufacturers filed ANDAs seeking approval to market 
generic versions of Wellbutrin XL.  Each of the four 
companies – Anchen, Abrika, Impax, and Watson – filed a 
paragraph IV certification.9  Of those companies, Anchen was 
the first to file its ANDA, and, as a result, was entitled to the 
180-day period of exclusivity. 
 
Biovail filed patent infringement suits against all four 
generic companies.  With one exception, it filed its several 
suits within 45 days of receiving each of the would-be 
                                              
8 Biovail obtained U.S. Patents 6,096,341 and 
6,143,327 (the ’341 and ’327 patents), while Andrx obtained 
U.S. Patent 6,905,708 (the ’708 patent).  At the time that 
Biovail and Andrx were conducting their research, it appears 
that most or all of the information relating to bupropion 
hydrochloride and its delivery mechanisms was in the public 
domain.  Neither Biovail nor Andrx needed to obtain a license 
from GSK in order to conduct its research.   
  
9 The companies’ full names are Anchen 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Abrika Pharmaceuticals, LLP, Impax 
Laboratories, Inc., and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
respectively.   
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competitors’ paragraph IV certifications.  As explained 
above, that triggered a stay that generally prevented the FDA 
from approving the ANDAs for 30 months, or until the 
resolution of the respective patent suits, whichever came first.  
Biovail did not file suit within the required 45-day period 
against Impax’s 300 mg dosage of extended release 
bupropion hydrochloride.  Impax was therefore not subject to 
the 30-month stay with respect to that product.  GSK joined 
Biovail’s suits against Anchen and Abrika but not the suits 
against Impax and Watson.10  
 
 In addition to its lawsuits, Biovail filed a “Citizen 
Petition” with the FDA on December 20, 2005.11  Biovail 
asked the FDA to impose certain requirements for approval of 
any generic version of Wellbutrin XL.  The FDA issued a 
final response to the Petition in December 2006, granting it in 
part and denying it in part.   
 
On December 21, 2005, Andrx filed suit against GSK, 
alleging that Wellbutrin XL, in 150 mg dosages, violated 
Andrx’s ’708 patent, see supra n.8.  Andrx also filed suit 
                                              
10 GSK’s CEO, Jean-Pierre Garner, explained that 
GSK elected not to join the suits against Impax or Watson 
because it did not believe it would have sufficient control 
over the litigation.   
 
11 Interested citizens may “petition the Commissioner 
[of the FDA] to issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order, 
or to take or refrain from taking any other form of 
administrative action.”  21 C.F.R. § 10.25.  GSK elected not 
to join Biovail’s FDA petition.   
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against Anchen for infringing the same patent with a generic 
version of Wellbutrin XL.  In both cases, Andrx sought 
damages and an injunction against the sale of infringing 
products.  In February 2007, all of the parties involved in the 
Wellbutrin-related patent litigation, except for Abrika, 
entered into a settlement.12     
 
The next year, in May 2008, this litigation began.  Two 
putative classes – a class of direct purchasers (e.g., entities 
like pharmacies that purchased Wellbutrin XL directly from 
GSK) and a class of indirect purchasers (e.g., consumers) – 
filed suits against Biovail and GSK.13  As noted at the outset 
                                              
12 Abrika settled with Biovail a few months later, after 
GSK had withdrawn from the suit.   
 
13 The direct-purchaser class includes “[a]ll persons or 
entities in the United States ... who purchased Wellbutrin XL 
directly from any of the Defendants at any time during the 
period November 14, 2005 through August 31, 2009... .”  (JA 
3.)  In total, the class contains over 30 members.  When 
certified, the indirect-purchaser class included “[a]ll persons 
or entities who purchased an [appropriately FDA- rated] 
generic bioequivalent of Wellbutrin XL ... at any time 
[between November 14, 2005 and April 29, 2011] in 
California, Florida, Nevada, New York, Tennessee and 
Wisconsin; and ... [a]ll entities that purchased 150 mg or 
300 mg Wellbutrin XL before an [appropriately FDA-rated] 
generic bioequivalent was available for such dosages AND 
purchased generic XL in the same state after generic XL 
became available in California, Florida, Nevada, New York, 
Tennessee and Wisconsin.”   (Appendix for 15-2875 at 6.) 
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of this opinion, both sets of plaintiffs alleged that Biovail and 
GSK conspired to prevent generic versions of Wellbutrin XL 
from entering the market.  The instrumentalities of the alleged 
conspiracy were, according to the Plaintiffs, sham lawsuits, a 
sham FDA petition, and an unlawful reverse payment 
settlement.  The direct purchasers brought their claims under 
federal law, while the indirect purchasers brought their claims 
under various state laws.  Biovail settled with both classes in 
November 2012, so only GSK has remained as a defendant.14   
 
The District Court had earlier granted summary 
judgment for GSK on the merits on all of the claims.  First, 
the Court granted summary judgment on the sham petition 
claims.  Shortly after that, it stayed both the direct-purchaser 
and indirect-purchaser cases while the Supreme Court 
considered potentially relevant petitions for writs of 
certiorari.  The District Court continued the stay in 
anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  After the Actavis 
opinion issued, the District Court granted summary judgment 
for GSK on the reverse payment claims.   
 
The District Court also rendered decisions regarding 
class certification.  It at first certified both putative classes.  
Later, however, it concluded that the indirect-purchaser class 
only had standing “under the laws of those states where the 
plaintiffs are located or their members reside.”  (JA 243.)  
The Court thus dismissed the claims arising under the laws of 
states that were not represented by one of the named 
plaintiffs.  In response, Aetna moved to intervene in the 
                                              
14 The two cases proceeded independently in the 
District Court, but were consolidated on appeal.   
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indirect-purchaser suit.  It alleged that it had purchased brand 
and generic Wellbutrin XL in all fifty states, and that, 
consequently, its intervention would alleviate the standing 
issues.  The Court denied Aetna’s motion.  In June 2015, the 
Court granted a motion to decertify the indirect-purchaser 
class on ascertainability grounds.   
 
Before us on appeal are the following rulings: the grant 
of summary judgment to GSK on all claims, the exclusion of 
the testimony of the Appellants’ economic expert, the 
decertification of the indirect-purchaser class, the dismissal of 
certain of the indirect-purchaser Appellants’ claims for lack 
of standing, and the denial of Aetna’s motion to intervene.  
GSK also conditionally challenges the certification of the 
direct-purchaser class.  And, should the indirect purchasers 
succeed in overcoming the ascertainability objection to 
certification of their class, GSK also conditionally appeals 
any certification of that class, citing problems with 
numerosity. 
24 
 
II. Discussion15 
 
A. Sham Litigation 
 
The first broad issue on appeal is whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment on the sham 
litigation claims.  The Appellants argue that GSK violated 
antitrust laws by conspiring with Biovail to prosecute sham 
lawsuits against Anchen, Abrika, Impax, and Watson, and to 
file a sham petition with the FDA.  According to the 
Appellants, GSK and Biovail worked together to press the 
infringement lawsuits in order to exploit the mandatory 30-
month stay created by the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The 
Appellants also allege that, but for the lawsuits and the FDA 
petition, the FDA would have approved Anchen’s ANDA 
immediately and likewise would have approved the other 
three ANDAs at the end of Anchen’s 180-day exclusivity 
                                              
15 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the direct purchasers’ claims under 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1337.  The District Court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over the indirect purchasers’ 
claims under 28 U.S.C § 1332(d)(2).  We have jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
order granting summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court.  We will affirm only if drawing 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks, citations, and modifications omitted). 
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period.  The assertion is that, without the delay in ANDA 
approvals, Anchen and the other generics would have 
launched their products sooner, resulting in increased 
competition and lower drug prices for pharmacies and 
consumers. 
 
1. Applicable Law 
 
A plaintiff claiming that a lawsuit is, by its very 
existence, anticompetitive and unlawful faces an uphill battle.  
It is well-established that the First Amendment protects the 
right to petition the government and to have access to the 
courts.  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1993);16 Cal. Motor Transp. 
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972); see also 
U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”).  That protection is 
the basis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which holds that 
“[t]hose who petition [the] government for redress are 
generally immune from antitrust liability.”17  PRE, 508 U.S. 
                                              
16 We will refer to Professional Real Estate Investors 
v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49 (1993), 
throughout this opinion as “PRE.” 
 
17 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine “takes its name from 
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that railroads’ publicity 
campaign to promote support for laws harmful to trucking 
interest was immune from antitrust liability), and United Mine 
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) 
(joint efforts by miners’ union and large coal companies to 
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at 56.  Noerr-Pennington immunity, however, is not absolute.  
“[A]ctivity ‘ostensibly directed toward influencing 
governmental action’ does not qualify for [first amendment] 
immunity if it ‘is a mere sham to cover ... an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor.’”  Id. at 51 (third alteration in original) (quoting 
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)). 
 
To determine whether a lawsuit qualifies as a “sham,” 
courts apply a two-part test:   
 
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in 
the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.  If an 
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is 
reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable 
outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, 
and an antitrust claim premised on the sham 
exception must fail.  Only if challenged 
litigation is objectively meritless may a court 
examine the litigant’s subjective motivation.  
Under this second part ..., the court should 
focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals 
an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor through the use of 
the governmental process—as opposed to the 
outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive 
                                                                                                     
have federal agency impose higher minimum wage for coal 
suppliers to TVA were immune from antitrust liability).”  
Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 841 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
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weapon.  This two-tiered process requires the 
plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit’s 
legal viability before the court will entertain 
evidence of the suit’s economic viability. 
 
PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61 (internal quotation marks, citations, 
alteration, and footnote omitted).18 
 
The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he existence 
of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a 
finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham 
litigation.”  Id. at 62.  In selecting “probable cause” as the 
standard by which to judge objective baselessness, the Court 
said that it was drawing from “[t]he notion of probable cause, 
as understood and applied in the common law tort of 
wrongful civil proceedings[.]”  Id.  A litigant has probable 
cause to initiate a suit if the litigant has “a reasonable belief 
that there is a chance that a claim may be held valid upon 
adjudication.”  Id. at 62-63 (internal citations, quotation, and 
alterations omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 675.  In other words, the essential question is not whether 
                                              
18 The Supreme Court in PRE indicated that the 
plaintiff in an antitrust suit has the burden of proving that the 
defendant is not entitled to immunity under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.  See PRE, 508 U.S. at 61 (explaining 
that a plaintiff must “demonstrat[e] both the objective and the 
subjective components of a sham”).  The Court was silent, 
however, as to the standard of proof (i.e., clear and 
convincing evidence, or preponderance of the evidence) 
needed to show objective baselessness.  Because our decision 
in this case does not hinge on the standard of proof, we leave 
that question for another day. 
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the suit succeeds, but whether the suit was a sham at the time 
it was filed.  See PRE, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5 (cautioning that 
“when the antitrust defendant has lost the underlying 
litigation, a court must resist the ... temptation to engage in 
post hoc reasoning by concluding that an ultimately 
unsuccessful action must have been unreasonable or without 
foundation” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 
 In addition, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that 
a defendant engaged in sham litigation.  “[A] plaintiff who 
defeats the defendant’s claim to Noerr immunity ... must still 
prove a substantive antitrust violation.”  Id. at 61.  That 
includes proving the challenged lawsuit is “causally linked” 
to an antitrust injury.  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (describing antitrust 
injury as “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended 
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ 
acts unlawful”). 
 
 As noted earlier, the Appellants argue that each of the 
patent infringement suits relating to generic versions of 
Wellbutrin XL (that is, each of the suits against Anchen, 
Abrika, Watson, and Impax), as well as the Citizen Petition, 
was an instance of anticompetitive sham litigation or sham 
petitioning that caused antitrust injury by delaying the entry 
of generic versions of Wellbutrin XL into the market.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment to GSK with 
respect to each of the five challenged actions.  We agree that 
the sham litigation claims fail, for reasons we now endeavor 
to explain. 
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2. The Anchen Lawsuit 
 
The sham litigation claim relating to the Anchen suit 
fails for the simple reason that an act of infringement plainly 
occurred.  The already high hurdle for stating an antitrust 
claim for anticompetitive litigation, PRE, 508 U.S. at 56, is 
higher still in the context of an ANDA case because, as 
described above, the Hatch-Waxman Act states that “[i]t shall 
be an act of infringement to submit” an ANDA for a drug 
claimed in a patent, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).  Since the 
submission of an ANDA is, by statutory definition, an 
infringing act, an infringement suit filed in response to an 
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification could only be 
objectively baseless if no reasonable person could disagree 
with the assertions of noninfringement or invalidity in the 
certification.  See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 
00-cv-6749, 2010 WL 2079722, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 
2010) (“[A]t the outset of Astra’s case, Mylan gave Astra an 
objectively reasonable basis to sue: Mylan provided Astra 
notice of its Paragraph IV certification.”), aff’d sub nom. In re 
Omeprazole Patent Litig., 412 Fed. App’x 297 (Fed Cir. 
2011).  It suffices here to say that this case does not present 
such a circumstance.  Anchen filed an ANDA for a drug that 
was claimed in Biovail’s ’341 patent.  There is nothing in the 
record indicating that Biovail, the patentee, and GSK, the 
exclusive licensee,19 were less than objectively reasonable in 
                                              
19 “Because the legally protected interests in a patent 
are exclusionary rights created by the Patent Act, a party 
holding one or more of those exclusionary rights—such as an 
exclusive licensee—suffers a legally cognizable injury when 
an unauthorized party encroaches upon those rights and 
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acting on that technical act of infringement, and that alone 
provides a sufficient basis for us to affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment.   
 
The content of the ANDA bolsters that conclusion.  As 
explained above, Wellbutrin XL used a formulation of 
bupropion hydrochloride described in Biovail’s ’341 patent.  
That patent discloses, among other things, “a core comprising 
bupropion hydrochloride and conventional excipients, free of 
stabilizer” (JA 3117, ’341 patent at 9:50-51 (emphasis 
added).)  Anchen’s paragraph IV certification asserted that 
“Anchen’s proposed product cannot be deemed literally to 
infringe [the patent] because it includes a stabilizing amount 
of hydrochloric acid in the core[,]” and thus does not satisfy 
the “free of stabilizer” limitation.  (JA 35714); see also 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a product must satisfy each 
of a claim’s limitations in order to infringe).  But Anchen’s 
ANDA suggested otherwise.  It included several tables listing 
the ingredients that would be present in Anchen’s drug, along 
with the relative percentages of each.  While the tables listed 
hydrochloric acid, which can serve as a stabilizer,20 they 
indicated that the acid would compose 0% of the final 
product.  To the same effect, the percentages associated with 
the other listed ingredients summed to 100%.  As if to 
emphasize that point, the tables explicitly stated that the 
                                                                                                     
therefore has standing to sue.”  WiAV Solutions LLC v. 
Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 
20 Hydrochloric acid is a stabilizing agent.  (See 
Anchen’s paragraph IV certification, JA 35714 (referring to 
hydrochloric acid as a stabilizing agent).) 
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hydrochloric acid had been “removed” or “evaporated” from 
the drug.  (JA 11748-52.)  That language provided GSK and 
Biovail with sufficient probable cause to file its infringement 
suit, and no reasonable jury – i.e., no jury considering the 
sham litigation claim – could conclude otherwise.  See Abbott 
Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (holding that the ANDA specification governs the 
infringement inquiry).   
 
The parties and the District Court invested 
considerable effort in addressing two subsidiary questions – 
whether FDA regulations required Anchen to quantify the 
amount of stabilizer present in its drug, and whether Biovail 
asserted a frivolous claim construction position.  Those 
disputes are ultimately irrelevant.  The question here is 
whether GSK and Biovail could have perceived “some 
likelihood of success” in their case at the time of filing.  PRE, 
508 U.S. at 65; Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 
1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (concluding that courts should 
evaluate the question of objective baselessness “in light of ... 
information [available] at the time of filing”).  At that time, 
the only information they had access to was an excerpt of 
Anchen’s ANDA – an excerpt that, under a plain reading, 
suggested the non-infringement theory offered in Anchen’s 
paragraph IV certification was, or at least could be, infirm.  
Viewed in that light, the FDA’s rules regarding quantification 
are insufficient to override the probable cause provided in the 
ANDA.  Again, the fact that one might conclude, after a 
thorough investigation, that Anchen’s ANDA did not 
definitively exclude the presence of hydrochloric acid does 
not mean it was unreasonable for GSK and Biovail to file 
their suit, as it was not unreasonable for them to take the 
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ANDA at face value.21  Similarly, the fact that a court (in the 
underlying patent litigation) rejected Biovail’s later proposed 
claim construction does not bear on whether the patent 
infringement suit was objectively baseless from the outset.22  
                                              
21 As explained above, Anchen’s ANDA quantified the 
amount of hydrochloric acid in its drug as “--” and indicated 
that the other ingredients summed to 100%.  The Appellants 
argue that, under standard industry convention, “--” denotes a 
residual quantity greater than zero.  However, they do not 
point to any evidence showing that GSK and Biovail’s 
interpretation of either “--” or “100%” was unreasonable.  
More to the point, they have not demonstrated that it was 
unreasonable to view the claim language “free of stabilizer” 
as covering a residual amount so small as to not register in the 
tables they provided. 
 
22 It is worth noting that GSK withdrew from the case 
well before claim construction began.  While it is no doubt 
important to think about possible constructions for patent 
claims before filing a case, it would be unfair to require 
parties to divine the outcome of claim construction before 
filing.  That is especially true in the Hatch-Waxman context, 
where many details about the potentially infringing drug 
(details that could shape a plaintiff’s claim construction 
position) cannot be known at the time a suit is filed and where 
there are congressionally designed pressures to file suit 
quickly.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(D) (stating that an ANDA 
applicant is required to provide notice to patentees 
“includ[ing] a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis 
of the opinion of the applicant that the patent[s] [are] invalid 
or will not be infringed,” but refraining from requiring 
ANDA applicants to submit any additional information).  The 
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See Rohm & Haas Co., 127 F.3d at 1092 (explaining that 
“[p]atent litigation is complex, long, and difficult” and that 
parties and courts rely on “discovery procedures, partial or 
complete summary judgment, and evidentiary rules to narrow 
the issues”). 
 
The Appellants also argue that the District Court 
“usurp[ed] the role of the jury” by “find[ing] facts.”  (Op. Br. 
53-54.)  We disagree.  In PRE, the Supreme Court held that 
courts can grant summary judgment on the issue of objective 
baselessness if “there is no dispute over the predicate facts of 
the underlying legal proceeding.”  508 U.S. at 63.  Here, the 
predicate facts include the content of Anchen’s ANDA.  The 
existence of that content – as opposed to its accuracy – is not 
in dispute.  Instead, the parties disagree about whether that 
content was sufficient to establish probable cause for the 
                                                                                                     
time limits imposed by the Hatch-Waxman Act embody a 
“file-now, discover-details-later” policy, and while the merit 
of that policy may make for an interesting debate, Aaron S. 
Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: 
Do We Need a Redesigned Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 
Yale J. Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 293 (2015) (describing the 
debate over whether the Act is good policy), it is not our 
place – nor was it GSK’s – to take that debate on.  We decline 
to apply the antitrust laws in a way that would undermine the 
operation of Hatch-Waxman. 
It is likewise a painful stretch to say that Biovail’s 
claim construction arguments show GSK was wrong to join in 
the initial decision to file against Anchen.  At the time the suit 
was filed, GSK was not obligated to know the details of claim 
construction arguments that Biovail would later present. 
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objective baselessness inquiry.  PRE, 508 U.S. at 62.  That, 
however, is a legal question, not a factual one.  Highmark, 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Under PRE, the reasonableness of a legal 
position … is itself a question of law[.]”); Stewart v. 
Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878) (“[P]robable cause is a 
question of law in a very important sense.  ... Whether the 
circumstances alleged to show it probable are true, and 
existed, is a matter of fact; but whether, supposing them to be 
true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law.”).  
In granting summary judgment, the District Court decided 
that GSK’s suit “[did] not fit the profile of objectively 
baseless sham litigation.”  (JA 72, 95.)  It was entitled to 
reach that legal conclusion.23 
 
 There is an additional problem with the Appellants’ 
argument that warrants discussion.  As we noted earlier, to 
establish an antitrust claim for anticompetitive litigation, the 
Appellants had to show not only that GSK’s litigation was a 
sham, but also that it caused an antitrust injury by delaying 
generic competition.  Based on the current record, they would 
have difficulty making such a showing, for at least two 
reasons.  First, generic entry would have been blocked by 
Biovail’s continuing litigation against Anchen, in which GSK 
did not participate.  Under Hatch-Waxman, the rule requiring 
the FDA to delay approving an ANDA is based not simply on 
the filing of a lawsuit but on the ongoing presence of a 
lawsuit.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (stating that the 
FDA may approve an ANDA as soon as “the district court 
                                              
23 That the Court elected at times to use the verb “find” 
instead of “conclude” does not change our decision.   
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decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed”).  GSK 
withdrew from the underlying litigation just a few months 
after the case was filed.  Biovail, however, continued to 
pursue the suit.  That is significant, as it means that the delay 
in competition based on the lawsuit should likely be attributed 
to Biovail rather than to GSK.24 
 
Second, and perhaps more formidably, generic entry 
would have been blocked by the ’708 patent owned by Andrx.  
We address the Andrx patent in more detail in the context of 
the reverse payment settlement.  The implications for 
causation, however, apply just as much to the Appellants’ 
sham litigation claims as they do to their reverse payment 
claims. 
                                              
24 GSK and Biovail filed their suit against Anchen on 
December 21, 2004.  GSK withdrew from the case exactly 
four months later, on April 21, 2005, long before the 30-
month stay expired.  In order to prevail against GSK, the 
Appellants must show that at least some delay can be 
attributed to GSK’s actions in the case – that is, they must 
show that at least some delay can be attributed to the first four 
months of the litigation.  There is no evidence in the record 
indicating that any delay can be linked to that period of time. 
In a heading in their statement of undisputed facts, the 
Appellants state that “GSK Withdrew From the Anchen and 
Abrika Cases But Not the Conspiracy[.]”  It takes some 
chutzpah to use that language, as GSK plainly disputes that it 
was ever in a conspiracy with Biovail.  We consider the 
conspiracy argument in more detail below. 
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3. The Abrika Lawsuit 
 
The Appellants contend that GSK and Biovail’s suit 
against Abrika was another instance of anticompetitive 
litigation.  As before, they argue that GSK and Biovail are not 
entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity because the lawsuit 
was a sham.  The District Court granted summary judgment 
to GSK based on its conclusion that there was insufficient 
evidence to show that the litigation delayed Abrika’s entry 
into the market.  Again, we agree. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that two of the arguments 
that defeated the Appellants’ claim relating to the Anchen 
litigation also justify affirming the District Court on this 
point.  First, Abrika’s ANDA, including the paragraph IV 
certification, provided GSK with an objectively reasonable 
basis to file its suit.25  Additionally, as in the Anchen case, 
GSK initially joined with Biovail in the infringement suit, but 
then withdrew, and Biovail continued to litigate.  That means 
that any delay attributable to the litigation would have existed 
even without GSK’s involvement.   
 
Moreover, there is an independent problem with the 
causation theory as it relates to the Abrika litigation.  The 
Appellants argue that the infringement suit against Abrika 
delayed Abrika’s entry into the market because the suit 
                                              
25 Without parsing the Abrika ANDA in the same 
detail as we did Anchen’s, it suffices to say that the 
Appellants have not provided evidence to demonstrate that it 
was objectively unreasonable for Biovail and GSK to act on 
the technical act of infringement that the ANDA and 
paragraph IV certification provided. 
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imposed a 30-month stay on the FDA’s approval of Abrika’s 
ANDA.  There is, however, no evidence that Abrika could 
have launched even in the absence of the 30-month stay.  To 
the contrary, it is undisputed that the FDA could not have 
approved Abrika’s ANDA until the end of Anchen’s 180-day 
first-filer exclusivity period, a period that would not even 
start until Anchen launched its drug.  Thus, it should surprise 
no one to learn that, while the 30-month stay imposed by 
GSK’s suit expired on June 21, 2007, Abrika’s ANDA was 
not approved until over a year later, after Anchen’s 
exclusivity period came to an end.  In responding to those 
facts, the Appellants in their Reply Brief appear to abandon 
their argument that it was the Abrika lawsuit that caused 
delay.  Instead, they argue that the delay was caused by the 
suit against Anchen.  That argument, however, is unavailing 
for the reasons already stated.  Because there is no evidence 
showing that GSK’s lawsuit against Abrika actually delayed 
Abrika’s entry into the market, the District Court rightly 
rejected it as a basis of liability. 
 
4. The Impax and Watson Lawsuits and the 
Appellants’ Conspiracy Theory 
 
 In contrast with the Anchen and Abrika lawsuits, GSK 
never joined the infringement litigation against Impax and 
Watson.  Biovail pursued those suits on its own.  
Nevertheless, the Appellants argue that all of Biovail’s 
Wellbutrin-related litigation was brought in furtherance of a 
conspiracy with GSK.  Once again, their arguments are 
wanting. 
 
 To avoid an adverse summary judgment on an antitrust 
conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must “present evidence ‘that 
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tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators 
acted independently.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (quoting 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 
(1984)).  “[A] plaintiff must offer enough evidence that the 
inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the 
competing inferences of independent action ... .”  Cosmetic 
Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 51 (3d Cir. 
2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Mere 
communication between alleged co-conspirators, without 
more, is not sufficient to defeat the presumption of 
independent action.  See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 
F.3d 112, 133 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that courts reject 
conspiracy claims that “seek to infer agreement from … 
communications despite a lack of independent evidence 
tending to show an agreement” (citation omitted) (alteration 
in original)); Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 
F.3d 996, 1014 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Plaintiffs … seek to infer an 
agreement from those communications despite a lack of 
independent evidence tending to show an agreement and in 
the face of uncontradicted testimony that only informational 
exchanges took place. Without more, they cannot do so.”). 
 
 The Appellants have markedly failed to offer 
meaningful evidence that excludes the possibility that Biovail 
acted independently.  With respect to the suits against Impax 
and Watson, the evidence that the Appellants do point to is a 
“common interest agreement” between Biovail and GSK,26 a 
                                              
26 GSK and Biovail did not produce the common 
interest agreement.  Instead, the parties stipulated that “[u]pon 
receiving [Anchen’s] Paragraph [IV] certification ... GSK and 
Biovail reached a common interest agreement with respect to 
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communication between Biovail and GSK in which GSK 
forwarded Impax’s paragraph IV certification, and an email 
from Biovail to GSK’s outside counsel stating that Biovail 
had not heard from GSK with respect to the Impax litigation 
and that Biovail “[did] not want to let the 45-day clock expire 
without consciously dealing with the issue.”27 (JA 2347.)  
That evidence is insufficient.  Biovail was the patentee and 
GSK the exclusive licensee on directly relevant technology, 
so communication between them acknowledging a common 
interest is hardly surprising and does not come close to 
supporting an inference that there was an unlawful conspiracy 
to stifle competition.  Likewise, it is not surprising to see that 
the companies exchanged e-mails relating to their shared 
interest.  The e-mails containing Impax’s paragraph IV 
certification and acknowledging Hatch-Waxman’s 45-day 
litigation window are the sort one would expect from two 
companies that share an interest in a pharmaceutical patent.  
That communication does not amount to a conspiracy to 
engage in sham litigation.  See In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) 
Antitrust Litig., 842 F.3d 34, 56 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that pharmaceutical companies have valid reasons for 
                                                                                                     
their common legal interest in potential infringement of [the 
’341 and ’327 patents] by Anchen or the filers of any 
additional ANDAs and related Paragraph [IV] notices ... .”  
(JA 11513.)  GSK and Biovail further stipulated that the 
common interest agreement “related to the Paragraph [IV] 
certifications of [Anchen, Abrika, and Impax]” as well as the 
Anchen and Abrika actions.  (Id.) 
 
27 The Appellants do not have any evidence regarding 
communication between Biovail and GSK with respect to the 
Watson suit. 
40 
 
communicating with each other, and concluding that evidence 
of such communication, without more, is not enough to 
establish an unlawful conspiracy). 
 
The Appellants do not fare any better with respect to 
their claim that the Impax and Watson suits were brought as 
part of a larger conspiracy involving all four infringement 
actions, the Citizen Petition filed with the FDA, and the 
overall settlement agreement.  Bare allegations cannot defeat 
summary judgment, and the Appellants have not pointed to 
any evidence to support their theory that there was a larger, 
overarching conspiracy.   
 
5. The FDA Citizen Petition 
 
Biovail (but not GSK) filed a Citizen Petition with the 
FDA, expressing concern regarding the sufficiency of the 
FDA’s bioequivalence criteria for generic versions of 
Wellbutrin XL.28  Biovail requested the FDA to require all 
generic manufacturers of the drug to do the following four 
things:  
                                              
28 As already discussed, for a generic manufacturer to 
obtain FDA approval of an ANDA, the manufacturer must 
demonstrate that its drug is bioequivalent to a drug that went 
through the rigorous NDA approval process.  Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2228.  “Bioequivalence is the absence of a significant 
difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient 
or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or 
pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of 
drug action when administered at the same molar dose under 
similar conditions in an appropriately designed study.”  21 
C.F.R. § 314.3 (2016). 
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(1) demonstrate that the generic formulation of 
[the drug] is bioequivalent to Wellbutrin ... 
Wellbutrin SR ... and Wellbutrin XL; 
 
(2) calculate and evaluate parameters in all of 
its bioequivalence trials based on concentrations 
of the patent drug and active metabolites; ... 
 
(3) conduct its bioequivalence trials at steady-
 state... [; and] 
 
[(4)] ... provide in vitro data demonstrating the absence 
of dose dumping if generic bupropion HCl extended-
release tablets are consumed with alcohol. 
 
(JA 37509.)  Six months after receiving the Petition, the FDA 
issued an interim response stating that the FDA “has been 
unable to reach a decision on [the] petition because it raises 
complex issues requiring extensive review and analysis by 
Agency officials.”  (JA 37507.)   
 
Another six months passed and, on December 14, 
2006, the FDA issued its final response to the Petition, 
granting it in part, and denying it in part.  The final response 
came on the same day that the FDA approved Anchen’s 
ANDA.  The Appellants allege that Biovail’s Citizen Petition 
was anticompetitive and unlawful because, again, it was filed 
in furtherance of a conspiracy with GSK to delay generic 
entry.  The District Court rejected that contention, concluding 
that the Appellants failed to “raise[] a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the unsuccessful and allegedly 
sham requests[(among the four requests Biovail made to the 
FDA)] caused any delay beyond the non-sham requests[.]”  
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(JA 127.)  The Court also concluded that the Appellants failed 
to show that Biovail filed the Petition as part of a conspiracy 
with GSK.   
 
On appeal, the Appellants argue that each of the four 
requests in the Petition was a sham, that there is no 
requirement to show the extent to which the delay was caused 
by sham requests (as opposed to meritorious requests), and 
that there was evidence to show that the Petition was filed as 
part of a conspiracy between Biovail and GSK.  Those 
arguments, though, are no more persuasive now than they 
were before the District Court.  
 
The most straightforward basis for affirmance is, once 
more, that the Appellants have failed to identify evidence 
showing that there was a conspiracy between Biovail and 
GSK, in this instance relating to the FDA petition.  Just as 
with the sham litigation conspiracy claims, the Appellants 
must “present evidence ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ 
that the alleged conspirators acted independently[,]” 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. 
at 764), and must “offer enough evidence that the inference of 
conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences 
of independent action … .”  Cosmetic Gallery, 495 F.3d at 51 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  They have not met that 
burden.  There is no evidence in the record showing that 
Biovail and GSK collaborated, let alone illegally conspired, 
on Biovail’s Citizen Petition, and there is no evidence 
showing that Biovail filed the Petition at the direction of GSK 
or in furtherance of a plan involving GSK.  On the contrary, 
the record indicates that GSK was not aware of Biovail’s 
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specific plans to file a petition,29 that neither GSK nor Biovail 
wanted to collaborate on a petition,30 that GSK refused to 
share its data with Biovail for use in a petition,31 and that 
GSK disagreed with the general premise of Biovail’s 
Petition.32 
 
                                              
29 Eight days before Biovail filed its Petition, GSK 
employees sent an internal email expressing uncertainty as to 
whether Biovail had filed a petition.   
 
30 GSK sent a fax to Biovail indicating that it “[did] 
not wish to participate in or be associated with ... Biovail 
explorations, deliberations, strategizing, decision-making, or 
ultimate advocacy with the FDA.”  (JA 12356.)  Biovail 
responded and confirmed that it “[did] not seek the 
participation of GSK[.]”  (JA 12358.) 
 
31 In e-mail correspondence, GSK employees 
acknowledged that “Biovail is curious if we have any 
information on metabolites that might form the basis of a 
challenge to the standard bioequivalence testing/standards.”  
(JA 13281.)  In response, Stan Hull, a GSK employee, 
explained that “[the] information is available internally, but 
has not been shared with Biovail, and it is our 
recommendation not to share metabolite data with Biovail.”  
(JA 13282.) 
 
32 Indeed, in a heading in their statement of undisputed 
facts, the Appellants state that “GSK concluded that the 
bioequivalence ... argument was wrong.”   
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In arguing otherwise, the Appellants point to an e-mail 
between two Biovail employees noting that “David [S]tout 
[who, at the time, was the President of U.S. Pharmaceutical 
Operations for GSK ... said that a generic to Wellbutrin XL 
would have to prove bioequivalence to [Wellbutrin IR] not to 
[Wellbutrin XL] to get approved.”  (JA 12621.)  Assuming 
the relevance of that statement, however, simple 
communication does not establish a conspiracy.  The 
Appellants claim that the e-mail shows that “GSK developed 
the [bioequivalence argument] and gave it to Biovail to put in 
the petition.”  (JA 2383.)  But the e-mail does not support that 
claim.  Nothing in the e-mail indicates that GSK wanted 
Biovail to include the bioequivalence argument in a Citizen 
Petition – the e-mail does not mention a petition and, in fact, 
there was no petition to which GSK could refer – the e-mail 
was written over a year and a half before any FDA petition 
was filed. 
 
The Appellants also point to an e-mail from David 
Stout to several GSK employees that asked the employees to 
“coordinate with Biovail on ... [d]eveloping an agreement for 
[the concerns relating to bioequivalence, steady-state testing, 
and dose-dumping] and formulat[ing] a plan for the filing of 
the petition.”  (JA 13261.)  At the same time, though, the 
Appellants ignore a follow-up e-mail indicating that GSK did 
not want to move forward with the Petition.  A week after 
Stout sent his e-mail, he received a response concluding that 
“a Citizen’s Petition requesting that all generic versions of 
Wellbutrin extended-release products be required to 
demonstrate a lack of food effect appears unnecessary as 
these are current confirmed requirements.”  (JA 13279.)  The 
evidence is thus inadequate to support the Appellants’ claim 
that GSK and Biovail collaborated on Biovail’s Petition, 
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much less that they conspired to use the Petition to suppress 
competition.33  Because we can affirm the District Court on 
that basis, we do not need to consider whether GSK is entitled 
to Noerr-Pennington immunity with respect to the Petition.34 
                                              
33 As was the case with each of the four sham lawsuit 
claims, there is another causation problem.  As we will 
explain in more detail below, Anchen’s launch would have 
been delayed by a blocking patent owned by Andrx.  That 
means that any delay caused by Biovail’s FDA Petition is 
irrelevant – the blocking patent would have prevented a 
lawful launch even in the absence of Biovail’s Petition. 
 
34 In evaluating Biovail’s Petition, the District Court 
considered the Petition as a series of four requests.  The Court 
concluded that two of the four requests were successful, and 
thus not baseless, and that two of the four requests were 
potentially baseless.  The Court then concluded that GSK was 
entitled to summary judgment because the Appellants had 
failed to show that their injury was attributable to the 
unsuccessful (and potentially sham) requests, rather than to 
the successful requests.   
We have doubts about that reasoning.  The flaw is in 
viewing the Petition as four independent requests, rather than 
as a single petition.  When considering whether a petition is 
entitled to immunity, courts should consider whether the 
petition as a whole is objectively baseless.  See Tyco 
Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 
F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e will determine whether 
Ethyl’s petition was objectively baseless ... .” (emphasis 
added)).  While the District Court considered the merit of 
each of the Petition’s constituent requests, it did not reach any 
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6. Serial Petitioning 
 
 In addition to arguing that GSK engaged in sham 
litigation with respect to each of the four suits against generic 
manufacturers and the Citizen Petition, the Appellants 
contend that GSK engaged in serial petitioning, and thus in an 
abuse of the opportunity to litigate.  They say that we should 
vacate and remand to allow the District Court to evaluate 
GSK’s actions in light of Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. 
Village Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015), an 
opinion we issued after the District Court’s final judgment.  
GSK responds that the serial petitioning argument was 
waived and that, even if we consider it, Hanover is readily 
distinguishable.  We decline to vacate and remand because 
the Appellants have not demonstrated that GSK engaged in 
serial petitioning.35  
                                                                                                     
conclusions regarding whether the Petition, in toto, was 
objectively baseless.  As a result, the Court’s consideration of 
causation and delay was premature.   
 
35 GSK argues that the Appellants did not properly 
preserve the serial petitioning claim below, despite the fact 
that the Supreme Court precedent on which Hanover 3201 
Realty, LLC v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d 
Cir. 2015), relied was decided “more than 40 years ago,” and 
that the Appellants’ trial counsel was familiar with it from a 
prior case.  (Ans. Br. 64.)  The Appellants respond that 
asserting a general theory of sham litigation was sufficient 
because in doing so, they “recounted a series of meritless 
petitions filed to frustrate competition and prolong the 
defendants’ monopoly.”  (Consolidated Reply Brief of Direct 
Purchaser and End-Payor Class Plaintiffs-Appellants 74.)  In 
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  In Hanover, we held that a plaintiff could more easily 
overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity when the defendant 
had engaged in multiple legal actions against the plaintiff.  
806 F.3d at 180.  We explained that, “[w]here there is only 
one alleged sham petition, [PRE]’s exacting two-step test 
properly places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the 
defendant.”  Id. at 180.  “In contrast, a more flexible standard 
is appropriate when dealing with a pattern of petitioning.”  Id.  
In the latter context, we ask “whether a series of petitions 
were filed with or without regard to merit and for the purpose 
of using the governmental process (as opposed to the outcome 
of that process) to harm a market rival and restrain trade.”  Id.  
To determine whether a practice of petitioning the 
government without regard to merit was used, “a court should 
perform a holistic review that may include looking at the 
defendant’s filing success—i.e., win-loss percentage—as 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s subjective 
motivations.”  Id.   
 
 At the outset, we reject the contention that GSK 
engaged in serial petitioning through “four lawsuits and a 
petition[.]” (Op. Br. 116.)  GSK was only involved in two of 
                                                                                                     
Hanover, we rejected an argument that the plaintiffs had 
waived a serial litigation claim where the plaintiffs 
“consistently” argued “that the sham exception applie[d]” and 
“alleg[ed] an ‘illegal scheme’ through a ‘series of sham 
litigations,’ [that] put Defendants on notice of the relevant 
facts[.]”  806 F.3d at 179 n.13.  Although the Appellants did 
not independently articulate the “series” claim in the District 
Court, we conclude that, as in Hanover, the recitation of 
sequential litigious activity was sufficient to preserve the 
claim.  
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the suits, and then only briefly.  GSK did not file suit against 
Impax or Watson, nor did it join the Citizen Petition that was 
filed with the FDA.  Biovail took those steps alone.  And we 
have already rejected the Appellants’ arguments that GSK 
was engaged in a conspiracy with Biovail.  When the 
Appellants’ serial petitioning claim is reduced to only the 
lawsuits against Anchen and Abrika, both of which GSK 
withdrew from, it must fail.  The test for serial petitioning 
announced in Hanover explicitly applies to “a series of legal 
proceedings” or “a pattern of petitioning[,]” 806 F.3d at 180, 
and two proceedings – each against an independent defendant 
– does not constitute a pattern. 
 
 The serial petitioning charge is particularly inapt 
because GSK’s actions were consistent with the design and 
intent of Hatch-Waxman.  The Act incentivizes brand-name 
drug manufacturers to promptly file patent infringement suits 
by rewarding them with a stay of up to 30 months if they do 
so.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  We are not inclined to 
penalize a brand-name manufacturer whose “litigiousness 
was a product of Hatch-Waxman.”  Kaiser Found. Health 
Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 
2009).  Doing so would punish behavior that Congress sought 
to encourage.  See id. (recognizing that the “volume of ... 
suits” filed by a brand-name manufacturer is “dependent on 
the number of generic companies attempting to enter the … 
marketplace, a matter over which the [brand-name 
manufacturer] ha[s] no control”).  For that reason too, we 
agree with the District Court’s rejection of the Appellants’ 
serial petitioning argument. 
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B. Reverse Payment Settlement Agreement 
 
The second major point of contention on appeal relates 
to a set of agreements that resolved Biovail’s infringement 
suits against Anchen, Impax, and Watson, and Andrx’s 
infringement suits against GSK and Anchen.  Each of the 
agreements was entered into on February 9, 2007, and 
together they settled many of the patent disputes related to 
Wellbutrin XL.  The Appellants argue that the overall 
settlement was unlawful and anticompetitive.  Before delving 
into the details of the agreements, we give some background 
on the events leading to the settlement.  
 
1. Events Leading to the Settlement 
 
In January 2006, in anticipation of the FDA’s approval 
of Impax’s ANDA, Anchen, Impax, and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals U.S.A entered into an agreement under 
which Anchen would waive its first-filer exclusivity to allow 
Teva to market Impax’s 300 mg version of Wellbutrin XL.36  
Pursuant to that agreement, Impax and Teva launched a 
generic version of 300 mg Wellbutrin XL in December 2006.  
                                              
36 This is Teva’s first appearance in this case.  It is 
another producer and distributor of generic drugs. 
As explained above, because Biovail filed its suit 
against Anchen promptly, it was able to delay the approval of 
Anchen’s ANDA for 30 months.  However, Biovail did not 
file against Impax within 45 days of receiving Impax’s 
paragraph IV certification.  As a result, the only barrier to the 
approval of Impax’s ANDA was Anchen’s first-filer 
exclusivity period. 
 
50 
 
That same month, Anchen’s ANDA was approved, and 
Anchen and Teva entered into a “Distribution and Supply 
Agreement,” under which Teva would launch Anchen’s 
150 mg version of Wellbutrin XL.  At that point, GSK, 
Biovail, and Teva (as the distributor for Anchen and Impax) 
entered into a “‘standstill’ agreement under which Teva, 
Anchen, and Impax agreed not to launch any more 300 mg 
generic product or any 150 mg generic product, and Biovail 
... agreed not to launch any authorized generic version of 
either dosage strength.”37  (JA 2435.)   
 
In the midst of that standstill, in February 2007, the 
parties entered into the series of agreements constituting the 
settlement.  By that time, Biovail had lost its infringement 
suit against Anchen in district court and had an appeal 
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.38  Each of the other infringement cases was pending 
in district court.  Also pending was a federal case filed by 
Biovail against the FDA challenging the FDA’s treatment of 
Biovail’s Citizen Petition.   
 
                                              
37 An “authorized generic” is a non-branded version of 
a brand-name drug that is produced by the brand-name 
company itself.   
 
38 The appeals process was at an early stage – Biovail 
filed its notice of appeal on September 13, 2006, and its 
opening brief on December 14, 2006.   
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2. The Settlement 
 
Five agreements constituting the overall settlement are 
relevant here.  The first was between GSK and Andrx and 
provided that GSK would settle with Andrx, “paying $35 
million to cover past use of the technology described in 
Andrx’s patent, plus an ongoing royalty rate in exchange for a 
license to the patent.” 39  (Ans Br. 14; see also JA 34043.)  
GSK also obtained the right to sublicense the Andrx patent.   
 
The second agreement was a license between Teva and 
Biovail.  It contained three relevant provisions.  First, it 
granted Teva a 180-day exclusive license to certain Biovail 
patents,40 so that Teva could sell a 150 mg version of generic 
Wellbutrin XL beginning on May 30, 2008, or earlier if 
Biovail lost its appeal in the Anchen case.41  Second, the 
agreement granted Teva an exclusive license to Biovail 
patents so that it could sell a 300 mg version of generic 
                                              
39 In November 2006, Andrx was acquired by Watson.  
For simplicity, we will continue to refer to Andrx by that 
name. 
 
40 To ensure that the license would, in fact, be 
exclusive, Biovail amended its development agreement with 
GSK.  To facilitate the settlement, GSK agreed to refrain 
from launching an authorized generic version of 150 mg 
Wellbutrin XL for the duration of Teva’s exclusive license.   
 
41 The agreement contained five other “trigger” 
provisions that would allow Teva to market generic versions 
of Wellbutrin.  None of the other provisions is relevant here. 
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Wellbutrin XL.42  The license ran from December 13, 2006 
through June 12, 2007.43  Finally, the agreement required 
Biovail to provide Teva with a supply of 150 mg and 300 mg 
generic Wellbutrin XL.44  Specifically, Biovail agreed to 
supply Teva with 75 million tablets of the 150 mg dosage.  
The agreement also contained two unlimited supply 
provisions (one for the 150 mg dosage and one for the 300 
mg dosage), obligating Biovail to provide Teva with an 
unlimited supply of Wellbutrin XL in the event that Biovail’s 
Citizen Petition ended up interfering with Teva’s launch.     
 
The third agreement was between Anchen and Biovail.  
In that agreement, Biovail granted Anchen a sublicense to 
Andrx’s ’708 patent – the patent that had been the subject of 
litigation involving Anchen’s 150 mg generic version of 
Wellbutrin XL.45  The parties also acknowledged that the 
                                              
42 Biovail and GSK similarly amended their 
development agreement to preclude GSK from launching an 
authorized generic version of 300 mg Wellbutrin XL.   
 
43 The license was written to retroactively authorize the 
sales that Teva had made prior to entering the license 
agreement.  The Appellants contend that the license was 
meaningless and that “Teva did not need a license to make 
and sell the product because Teva was already doing so.”  (JA 
2635.) 
 
44 The agreement specified that the tablets must be 
“Generic NDA Equivalent.”  (JA 34081.) 
 
45 The agreement explains that Biovail was an assignee 
of the license agreement between Andrx and GSK, and thus 
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agreement did not “settle or otherwise end the Biovail 
Anchen lawsuit.”  (JA 3697.) 
 
The fourth agreement was between Biovail and Impax, 
in which Biovail agreed to dismiss its infringement suit 
against Impax and agreed not to sue Impax for selling or 
manufacturing generic versions of Wellbutrin XL outside of 
Anchen’s 180-day exclusivity period.   
 
The fifth agreement was an “omnibus” one in which 
the several parties acknowledged that the second through fifth 
agreements were related to each other and agreed to submit 
those agreements to the FTC for approval.  The parties further 
agreed to modify the agreements in response to any FTC 
concerns.46   
                                                                                                     
that Biovail had the ability to grant a sublicense to Andrx’s 
patent.   
 
46 By statute, the parties were required to submit their 
several settlement agreements to the FTC within 10 days.  
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112(a), 
117 Stat 2066, 2461-62 (2003).  The omnibus agreement 
required the parties to submit the agreements to the FTC 
within two days and to either revise or terminate the 
agreement in response to any FTC concerns.  In addition to 
the five agreements described above, Andrx sent a letter to 
Anchen explaining that, in light of the license agreement 
between GSK and Andrx, Andrx would dismiss its 
infringement suit against Anchen.  That same day, Biovail 
and GSK amended their development agreement (the 
agreement that granted GSK an exclusive license to Biovail’s 
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Pursuant to the terms of the agreements, Anchen 
waited until May 2008 to launch its 150 mg generic version 
of Wellbutrin XL, and GSK waited 180 days to launch 
authorized generic versions of both 150 mg and 300 mg 
Wellbutrin XL.   
 
3. The Appellants Cannot Prevail on Their 
Antitrust Claims Pertaining to the 
Alleged Reverse Payment 
 
In order to prevail on an antitrust claim, a private 
plaintiff must establish antitrust standing, Ethypharm S.A. 
France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 232-33 (3d Cir. 
2013), and must show that the defendant’s actions violated 
antitrust law.  Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Fundamentals of Antitrust Law 3-16 (4th ed. 2015).  In this 
case, there is an additional threshold question – whether the 
challenged agreements are immune from antitrust scrutiny as 
the valid exercise of patent rights.  See Dawson Chem. Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (explaining that 
“the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others 
from profiting by the patented invention”); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“A patent grants the right 
to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.  In 
doing so it provides an exception to antitrust law, and the 
scope of the patent ... forms the zone within which the patent 
                                                                                                     
patents) to bring it into compliance with the substance of the 
Teva-Biovail agreement.  Finally, Biovail agreed to dismiss 
its suit against Watson.  There was no payment (reverse or 
otherwise) associated with the Biovail-Watson settlement.   
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holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 
a) The Agreements Are Not Immune 
from Antitrust Scrutiny; the Rule 
of Reason Test Applies 
 
The Supreme Court considered the legality of reverse 
payment settlements in FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.  In 
that case, a brand-name drug manufacturer sued an ANDA 
applicant.  Id. at 2229.  After litigating the case for several 
years, the parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby 
the brand manufacturer paid the generic manufacturer tens of 
millions of dollars in exchange for the generic’s agreement to 
delay its entry into the market for nine years.  Id. at 2229-30.  
The FTC filed suit challenging the settlement agreement.  Id. 
at 2227.  Although the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that reverse payment settlements should 
be immune from antitrust liability, as long as they fall within 
the scope of the relevant patents, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 
677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), the Supreme Court saw 
it differently.  It said that “reverse payment settlements ... can 
sometimes violate the antitrust laws” and that “courts 
reviewing such agreements should ... apply[] [the] ‘rule of 
reason’ [test].”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237.47  In 
reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that “it would be 
incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the 
                                              
47 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the claim that 
reverse payment settlement agreements are “presumptively 
unlawful” and concluded that it would also be improper to 
evaluate reverse payment agreements via a “quick-look” 
approach.  Id. at 2237. 
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settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law 
policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive 
antitrust policies as well.”  Id. at 2231.  The Court then 
explained that reverse payments can generate “genuine 
adverse effects on competition” by allowing brand 
manufacturers to “avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a 
finding of noninfringement.”  Id. at 2235-36.  Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that “a reverse payment, where large and 
unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant 
anticompetitive effects[.]”  Id. at 2237. 
 
In King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline 
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015), we considered 
whether antitrust scrutiny under Actavis was limited to 
reverse payments of cash, or whether other “transfers of 
value” would also be subject to scrutiny.  Like the agreement 
at issue in this case, King involved a settlement in which a 
brand manufacturer agreed not to produce an “authorized 
generic” version of its drug – a so-called “no-AG agreement.”  
Id. at 394.  The antitrust plaintiffs in that case alleged that the 
no-AG agreement qualified as a reverse payment under 
Actavis.  See id.  We agreed and held that “Actavis’s holding 
[could not] be limited to reverse payments of cash.”  Id. at 
403.  We explained: 
 
[A] brand’s commitment not to produce an 
authorized generic means that it must give up 
the valuable right to capture profits ... .  The no-
AG agreement transfers the profits the patentee 
would have made from its authorized generic to 
the settling generic—plus potentially more ... 
because there will now be a generic monopoly 
instead of a generic duopoly.  
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Id. at 405.  As a result, we concluded that “no-AG agreements 
are likely to present the same types of problems as reverse 
payments of cash” and that “[t]he anticompetitive 
consequences of [a no-AG agreement] may be as harmful as 
those resulting from reverse payments of cash.”  Id. at 404-
05. 
 
When evaluating the challenged settlements in this 
case, the District Court suggested, but did not hold, that they 
might be beyond the reach of antitrust law.  According to the 
Court, “the Wellbutrin Settlement does not present the same 
antitrust concerns that motivated the court in Actavis to 
subject the settlement to antitrust scrutiny” because “the 
Wellbutrin Settlement required the underlying patent 
litigation to continue, maintaining the risk of a finding of 
patent invalidity or non-infringement[.]”  (JA 182-83.)  
Despite that intimation, the Court declined to hold that “any 
reverse payment that allows the underlying patent litigation to 
continue is automatically exempt from the antitrust laws.”  
(JA 184.)  Instead, the Court analyzed the settlement using 
the rule of reason.  On appeal, GSK echoes the initial 
intimation of the District Court and maintains that “[t]he 
settlement did not pose the anticompetitive harm the Supreme 
Court identified in Actavis[.]”  (Ans. Br. 67.)  We disagree. 
 
In light of Actavis and our decision in King, the 
agreements at issue in this case, as they relate to Anchen’s 
generic version of 150 mg Wellbutrin XL, must be evaluated 
under the rule of reason test.  As explained above, the 
agreements include an alleged reverse payment and pay-for-
delay scheme: in exchange for a 180-day no-AG agreement 
from Biovail and GSK (the reverse payment), Anchen agreed 
not to launch a generic version of 150 mg Wellbutrin XL until 
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the occurrence of a triggering event.  Moreover, there is some 
support in the record for the assertion that the reverse 
payment is large and unjustified, see Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2237 (suggesting that reverse payments are especially 
problematic if they are “large and unjustified”).  First, the 
payment can be said to be large.  According to the 
Appellants’ economic expert,48 the no-AG agreement was 
worth $233 million to Anchen, Teva, and Impax – an amount 
that would qualify as large in most any context.  See Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2237 (explaining that “the likelihood of a reverse 
payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon 
its size [and] scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future 
litigation costs”).  The “payment,” i.e., the no-AG agreement, 
could also be said to be unjustified in the sense of being 
unexplained.49  In particular, it was not tied to the merits of 
the litigation between Biovail and Anchen.  We know that the 
                                              
48 The District Court granted a Daubert motion to 
exclude that expert’s opinion relating to the rule of reason 
analysis.  However, the Daubert motion did not appear to 
challenge the expert’s opinions with respect to the value 
associated with the no-AG agreement.  And, in Actavis, the 
Supreme Court recognized the immense value associated with 
market exclusivity.  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (citing C. 
Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006)). 
 
49 We intend no comment on whether a no-AG 
promise could be justified in the sense of being a sound 
exercise of business judgment and consonant with good 
public policy. 
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no-AG agreement was not linked to the merits of the 
litigation because its value did not depend on the outcome of 
the appeal before the Federal Circuit.  The duration of the no-
AG promise was fixed at 180 days, regardless of who 
prevailed in the case, and that duration provided value to 
Anchen, as well as to Teva and Impax.50  Because the 
                                              
50 It is worth noting that this case differs from Actavis 
and King in at least one important respect: in both Actavis and 
King, the challenged agreements ended litigation between the 
brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer.  In 
this case, however, the agreements allowed Biovail’s appeal 
to continue.  (See JA 3697 (explicitly noting that the 
agreement did not “settle or otherwise end the Biovail 
Anchen lawsuit”).)  In acknowledging that difference, the 
District Court concluded that the agreements in this case 
“do[] not present the same antitrust concerns that motivated 
the court in Actavis to subject the settlement to antitrust 
scrutiny.”  (JA 183.)  We question that conclusion.  While 
there is language in Actavis that describes the premature 
termination of litigation as an anticompetitive harm, see 133 
S. Ct. at 2236 (explaining that a patentee should not be 
allowed to “us[e] its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of 
patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement”), the 
Supreme Court’s holding was not so narrow.  Instead, Actavis 
stands for the broader proposition that both “patent and 
antitrust policies are ... relevant in determining the ‘scope of 
the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law 
immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”  Id. at 2231.  In 
other words, the Court took issue with reverse payments not 
simply because they could lead to the premature termination 
of litigation, but rather because they eliminate the risk of 
competition.  Id. at 2236; King, 791 F.3d at 405. 
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agreements at issue here are such as to implicate the concerns 
identified in Actavis, they are not immune from antitrust 
scrutiny and must, to a degree, be evaluated under the rule of 
reason test. 
 
 That “to a degree” qualifier is added because our 
conclusion is limited to the agreements as they relate to 
Anchen’s generic version of 150 mg Wellbutrin XL.  We 
reach a different conclusion with respect to the agreements as 
they relate to Anchen’s 300 mg Wellbutrin XL.51  As 
                                                                                                     
While the agreements at issue here did not end the 
litigation between Biovail and Anchen, they nevertheless 
implicate the kinds of concerns articulated in Actavis by 
delaying the entry of 150 mg generic Wellbutrin XL and by 
delaying the entry of an authorized generic version of both 
150 and 300 mg Wellbutrin XL.  That conclusion follows 
directly from Actavis and King and is also supported by the 
FTC, which filed an amicus brief in this case.  (See FTC Br. 
15 (“An agreement that forecloses the possibility of at-risk 
entry into the market (in exchange for shared monopoly 
profits) can also be anticompetitive under that analysis.”).)  
The view of the law espoused by the FTC, adopted by the 
majority in Actavis, and followed by our Court in King, has 
been subject to cogent criticism, see, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2240-47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), but the controlling 
precedent is what it is. 
 
51 It does not appear that the Appellants have presented 
any arguments relating exclusively to Anchen’s generic 
version of 300 mg Wellbutrin XL.  As a result, any arguments 
the Appellants might have regarding the 300 mg product 
could be viewed as waived.  Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 
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explained above, Anchen, in partnership with Impax and 
Teva, launched a 300 mg version of Wellbutrin XL in 
December 2006 – as soon as its ANDA was approved.  The 
agreements reached in February 2007 allowed Teva to 
continue marketing that product.  As a result, there was no 
delay associated with the 300 mg product and the analysis in 
Actavis does not apply.  As a result, any pay-for-delay claim 
unique to Anchen’s 300 mg product must fail.52  
 
b) The Appellants Do Not Have 
Antitrust Standing 
 
In order to maintain an antitrust suit, a plaintiff must 
establish antitrust standing, which is distinct from Article III 
standing.  While Article III standing is rooted in the 
Constitution, antitrust standing is a judge-made doctrine.53  
                                                                                                     
143 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, for the reasons stated above, 
the Appellants would not prevail on that issue even if it were 
not waived. 
 
52 One could argue that the no-AG agreement relating 
to the 300 mg product was part of the payment used to 
persuade Anchen to delay its launch of the 150 mg product.  
If one adopts that view, then the 300 mg no-AG agreement 
would be subject to the same analysis as the 150 mg no-AG 
agreement and there would not be any claim unique to the 
generic 300 mg product. 
 
53 Though judge-made, federal antitrust standing is 
rooted in federal statutory law, and antitrust standing under 
state law is likewise rooted in the respective statutes of the 
several states represented within the ranks of the indirect-
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Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534-35 & n.31 (1983); 
Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 232 
n.17 (2013) (“[A]ntitrust standing is based on prudential 
principles.”).  It is not a jurisdictional requirement.  In re 
Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 263 n.30 (3d Cir. 
2016).  And while “[h]arm to the antitrust plaintiff is 
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of 
injury in fact,” courts must also consider “whether the 
plaintiff is a proper party to bring [the] private antitrust 
action.”  Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31.  
In that sense, antitrust standing is more properly viewed as an 
element of an antitrust claim that can be resolved at summary 
judgment.  Ethypharm S.A. France, 707 F.3d at 232 n.15 
                                                                                                     
purchaser Appellants.  The state requirements for antitrust 
standing are functionally identical to the federal requirements 
in this respect – each of the state antitrust laws asserted in this 
case requires antitrust plaintiffs to prove that they have 
suffered an antitrust injury.  Moreover, the standards for 
proving antitrust injury under the state laws appear to be 
identical to the standards under federal law.  See Breakdown 
Servs., Ltd. v. Now Casting, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1141 
(C.D. Cal. 2007); Boulware v. State of Nev., Dept. of Human 
Res., 960 F.2d 793, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nevada); 
Benjamin of Forest Hills Realty, Inc. v. Austin Sheppard 
Realty, Inc., 823 N.Y.S.2d 79, 94 (App. Div. 2006); Lerma v. 
Univision Commc’ns, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1016 (E.D. 
Wis. 1999); Rockholt Furniture, Inc. v. Kincaid Furniture 
Co., 1998 WL 1661384, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. July 6, 1998).  As 
a result, our standing and causation analysis on this issue 
applies equally to the direct purchasers’ claims and the 
indirect purchasers’ claims. 
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(indicating that antitrust standing is a “merits issue”); see also 
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 
F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997) (considering the question of 
antitrust standing at summary judgment, and determining 
whether the plaintiff “adduced sufficient evidence to permit a 
reasonable factfinder to conclude that it competed in the 
market in which trade was allegedly restrained, such that its 
alleged injury would constitute ‘antitrust injury’”); McCarthy 
v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 852-54 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(resolving the question of antitrust standing at summary 
judgment). 
 
To establish antitrust standing, a plaintiff must show 
that it has suffered an antitrust injury54 – that is, an “injury of 
                                              
54 “The Supreme Court ... [has] articulated several 
factors to be considered when deciding whether a 
complainant has antitrust standing.”  Ethypharm S.A. France, 
707 F.3d at 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Those factors include:   
 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 
intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) 
whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended 
to provide redress; (3) the directness of the 
injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might 
produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 
more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
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the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that 
flows from that which makes [the] defendants’ acts 
unlawful.” 55  Ethypharm S.A. France, 707 F.3d at 233 (3d 
                                                                                                     
recovery or complex apportionment of 
damages. 
 
Id. at 232-33 (internal citations omitted).  Because “[t]he 
second factor, antitrust injury, is a necessary but insufficient 
condition of antitrust standing[,] ... if it is lacking, we need 
not address the remaining ... factors.”  Id. at 233 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also City of 
Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 265 
(“[B]ecause there is no causal connection and no antitrust 
injury, we need not examine the other ... standing factors.”). 
     
55 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court 
held that indirect purchasers do not have standing to bring 
antitrust suits under federal law.  431 U.S. 720, 730-31 
(1977); see also In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust 
Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1163 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[In Illinois 
Brick Co.,] [t]he Court held that § 4 [of the Clayton Act] did 
not permit ... indirect purchasers ... to recover for the 
overcharge passed through the chain of distribution.”).  
However, indirect purchasers do have standing to assert 
antitrust claims in each of the state causes of action asserted 
here.  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598A.210 (Nevada statute granting 
standing to indirect purchasers to recover for antitrust 
violations); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (Dram) 
Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (recognizing that indirect purchaser suits are permitted 
in Arizona, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
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Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Brunswick Corp., 
429 U.S. at 489).   
 
In order to establish antitrust injury here, the 
Appellants must show that the harm they say they 
experienced – increased drug prices for Wellbutrin XL (and 
its generic equivalents) – was caused by the settlement they 
are complaining about.  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969) (explaining that, 
under the Clayton Act, a plaintiff must prove that it has 
suffered at least “some damage flowing from the unlawful 
conspiracy”).  The Appellants attempt to meet their burden by 
pointing to evidence showing that, in the absence of the 
agreements, Anchen (partnering with Teva) would have 
launched its 150 mg generic no later than the middle of 2007.   
 
At first glance, that argument seems appealing.  
Indeed, the District Court found that there was at least a 
question of fact as to whether Anchen would have launched 
the drug in June 2007.  The problem with the argument, 
however, is that it does not take into account Andrx’s 
blocking patent, the ’708 patent.  It is not enough for the 
Appellants to show that Anchen wanted to launch its drug; 
they must also show that the launch would have been legal.  
After all, if the launch were stopped because it was illegal, 
then the Appellants’ injury (if it could still be called that) 
                                                                                                     
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin); Indirect 
Purchaser Lawsuits: A State-by-State Survey 27, 215, 287, 
337 (Eric McCarthy et al., eds., 2010) (explaining that 
California, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin each allow 
indirect purchasers to assert antitrust claims). 
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would be caused not by the settlement but by the patent laws 
prohibiting the launch.  See In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) 
Antitrust Litig., 842 F.3d 34, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
argument that [the generic manufacturer] would have incurred 
the risk of launching at risk or that [it] would have won its ... 
suit against [the patent holder] depends on the theory that ... 
[the] patents were invalid or not infringed by a generic 
version.”); Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 3.04[B] (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 
2015) (“[A] plaintiff cannot be injured in fact by private 
conduct excluding it from the market when a statute prevents 
the plaintiff from entering that market in any event.”).56 
 
That a regulatory or legislative bar can break the chain 
of causation in an antitrust case is beyond fair dispute.  For 
example, in RSA Media, Inc. v. AK Media Grp., Inc., 260 
F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2001), the First Circuit decided that the 
plaintiff was excluded from the outdoor billboard market not 
because of the defendant’s actions but rather “because the 
Massachusetts regulatory scheme ... [prevented] new 
billboards from being built.”  Similarly, in In re Canadian 
Import Antitrust Litigation, 470 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 
2006), the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs faced higher 
drug prices not because drug companies excluded cheaper 
                                              
56 GSK also argues that Anchen’s launch would have 
been blocked by FDA regulations relating to Anchen’s 
production facilities.  We do not consider that argument 
because, even if it were given full weight, it would only show 
that Anchen would have had to wait until June 12, 2007 to 
launch – a date that was almost a year prior to its actual 
launch.  In other words, the argument relates to the length of 
delay, rather than the existence of a delay. 
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Canadian drugs from the market but because federal law 
excluded the cheaper Canadian drugs.  See City of Pittsburgh 
v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(applying the same principle and concluding that any injury 
suffered by the plaintiff resulted from “the realities of the 
regulated environment” rather than from the defendants’ 
actions).  In this case, the launch of Anchen’s 150 mg version 
of Wellbutrin XL was effectively blocked by federal patent 
law, which, through Andrx’s ’708 patent, would have 
prevented market entry. 
 
The Appellants offer two arguments to fend off that 
conclusion – one legal and one factual.  Their legal argument 
is that the reasoning just given was repudiated by our decision 
in Consolidated Express, Inc., v. New York Shipping 
Association.  602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated 448 U.S. 
902 (1980), remanded and affirmed, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 
1981).  They misread that case.  In Consolidated Express, we 
held that an antitrust plaintiff’s improper conduct did not 
preclude that plaintiff from asserting an antitrust claim 
unrelated to the improper conduct.  Id. at 508.  By contrast, 
our holding in this case is that the antitrust claim fails because 
the actions of GSK, the defendant, did not actually cause the 
Appellants’ claimed injury.  But even if the Appellants had a 
correct reading of Consolidated Express, their argument 
would still fail because that case predates significant 
developments in antitrust standing jurisprudence.  
Consolidated Express was decided in 1979, before the 
Supreme Court established its antitrust standing “factors” in 
Associated General Contractors four years later.  See 
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 965 
(3d Cir. 1983) (applying the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Associated General Contractors).  We later adopted the very 
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argument that the Appellants now claim is not good law.  In 
City of Pittsburgh we said that no antitrust standing exists 
when a plaintiff’s grievance is caused by a regulatory scheme 
rather than by the defendant’s actions.  147 F.3d at 266.  We 
decline to deviate from the well-reasoned path marked in City 
of Pittsburgh. 
 
The Appellants’ factual response is that, but for the 
challenged agreements, Anchen would have been able to 
launch its 150 mg version of Wellbutrin XL without running 
afoul of Andrx’s patent.  They offer two scenarios.  First, they 
argue that, in the absence of the challenged agreements, 
Anchen would have obtained a license to Andrx’s patent.  We 
will refer to that as the license-based scenario.  Alternatively, 
they argue that, in the absence of the challenged agreements, 
Anchen would have prevailed against Andrx in litigation.  We 
will refer to that as the litigation-based scenario.  The record 
supports neither. 
 
(1) License-Based Scenario 
 
The Appellants contend that, for at least three reasons, 
Anchen would have obtained a license from Andrx.  First, 
they say that GSK failed to produce evidence “showing [that] 
… GSK’s no-AG payment or the generic delay … were 
necessary in order [for Anchen] to secure a ... license [to 
Andrx’s patent].”  (Op. Br. 74.)  That argument, however, 
flips the burden of proof.  As the plaintiffs, the Appellants 
have the burden of proving that they have been injured.  In 
order to withstand summary judgment, they must point to 
evidence affirmatively showing that Anchen could have 
launched.  See W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 
627 F.3d 85, 101 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he plaintiff must 
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establish that it suffered an antitrust injury.”).  It is no good 
saying that the defendants have failed to disprove causation.  
See id. 
 
Second, the Appellants say that Andrx had “an 
independent economic interest” in providing a license to 
Anchen.  (Op. Br. 74.)  Their reasoning is that Andrx was a 
non-practicing entity and thus “could only profit from its ‘708 
patent through licenses.”  (Id. at 74.)  That argument is both 
incorrect and insufficient.  The argument is incorrect because, 
as noted above, supra n.39, Watson acquired Andrx in 
November 2006.  That means that Andrx was, by that time, 
not a non-practicing entity and in fact had a reason to deny 
Anchen a license.  If Anchen were precluded from launching 
its product, then Anchen would waive its exclusivity period, 
allowing Watson (a/k/a Andrx) to enter the market earlier.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (outlining the conditions in 
which a first-filer waives its exclusivity).  But, even if the 
Appellants’ argument were better rooted in reality, it would 
be insufficient.  In order to withstand summary judgment, the 
Appellants must produce evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that it is more likely than not that Anchen 
would have obtained a license.  Evidence showing that 
Anchen may have been able to obtain a license does not meet 
that standard.  A plaintiff cannot satisfy the summary 
judgment burden based on speculation alone.  See Halsey v. 
Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A]n inference 
based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a 
material factual dispute sufficient to defeat [entry of] 
summary judgment.” (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, 
Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990))); Fedorczyk v. 
Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(affirming a grant of summary judgment because “[b]ased on 
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the evidence presented, a jury could only speculate” as to 
whether the defendant’s actions actually caused the claimed 
injury).57 
 
Third, the Appellants argue that Anchen was 
negotiating a license agreement with Andrx in the days 
preceding the agreements and had agreed on all but one term.  
Based on those negotiations, the Appellants argue, a 
                                              
57 The Appellants point to our recent decision in In re 
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation, 
852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), to support their claim that juries 
are “‘routinely’ given questions that permissibly require them 
to ‘predict the outcome of a hypothetical scenario’ or to 
‘speculate’ or ‘guess what could have happened in a 
counterfactual setting’ by assessing corporate motives and 
thought processes or by ‘evaluat[ing] inference[s] about 
human behavior.’”  (March 27, 2017 28(j) letter at 2 
(alterations in original) (quoting Fosamax, 852 F.3d at 289, 
297, 299).)  Their argument is correct, but irrelevant.  The 
fact that juries may predict the outcome of hypothetical 
scenarios says nothing about the type or amount of evidence 
that is needed for a plaintiff to withstand summary judgment 
on a claim involving a counterfactual scenario.  As explained 
above, the Appellants have not presented sufficient evidence 
upon which a reasonable jury could rely to conclude that it is 
more likely than not that Anchen and Andrx would have 
entered into a license agreement in the counterfactual world.  
While it may be better than speculative that Anchen and 
Andrx would have had an incentive to talk, it is, on this 
record, pure speculation that they would have reached an 
agreement. 
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reasonable jury could infer that the two companies would 
have reached an agreement.  But this argument too is 
completely speculative.  It is certainly possible that Anchen 
and Andrx would have reached an agreement, but it is also 
certainly possible that the negotiations would have stalled and 
failed.  Many a contract has foundered on a single deal-
breaker point.  Without more specific or concrete evidence, 
the jury in this case would be left with nothing on which it 
could rely to reach a conclusion one way or the other.  
Summary judgment was thus appropriate. 
 
(2) Litigation-Based Scenario 
 
 The Appellants’ litigation-based scenario is premised 
on the idea that Anchen would have prevailed in Andrx’s 
infringement suit.  If Andrx’s ’708 patent  were invalid, or if 
it did not cover Anchen’s product, then patent law would not 
have prevented Anchen’s launch.  In order to evaluate the 
merit of the litigation-based scenario, we must consider the 
substance of that underlying litigation.58 
                                              
58 In the Actavis decision, there was a debate between 
the majority and the Chief Justice on whether lower courts 
would be required to resolve substantive patent questions in 
order to adequately assess the merits of reverse payment 
antitrust claims.  Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer 
asserted that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent 
validity to answer the antitrust question ... .”  Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2236.  The Chief Justice disagreed:  
 
[S]ettling a patent claim cannot possibly impose 
unlawful anticompetitive harm if the patent 
holder is acting within the scope of a valid 
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The Appellants make two arguments relative to the 
merits of the patent litigation.  First, they say that we should 
view the size of the reverse payment as “a surrogate for [the] 
patent’s weakness” and conclude that GSK “knew [that 
Andrx’s patent] could not prevent generic competition.”  (Op. 
Br. 86.)  While the size of a reverse payment may have some 
relevance in determining how confident a litigant is in the 
strength of its case, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37 (“In a 
word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can 
provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness ... .”), it 
is far from dispositive.  That is especially so when, as in this 
case, the settlement is complex and multi-faceted.  For 
                                                                                                     
patent and therefore permitted to do precisely 
what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful.  This 
means that in any such antitrust suit, the 
defendant (patent holder) will want to use the 
validity of his patent as a defense—in other 
words, he’ll want to say “I can do this because I 
have a valid patent that lets me do this.” I 
therefore don’t see how the majority can 
conclude that it won’t normally be “necessary 
to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust 
question[.]” 
 
Id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The present case 
appears to vindicate the Chief Justice’s analysis.  As he 
predicted, GSK argues that the Andrx patent (which was a 
central component of the agreements) defeats the Appellants’ 
suit, and, as he predicted, we cannot resolve this aspect of the 
case without considering the merits of the underlying patent 
dispute. 
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example, GSK and Biovail may have offered the reverse 
payment not because they thought Andrx had a weak patent 
but rather because they thought Anchen would improperly 
evaluate the patent and launch at-risk.59  In that scenario, 
GSK would lose substantial revenue from having a generic 
competitor and would not be entitled to damages if the patent 
were vindicated because the patent belonged to Andrx, not to 
GSK.  That there are multiple plausible ways to interpret the 
reverse payment in this case means that the payment alone 
tells us less about the merits of the underlying case than the 
Appellants wish. 
 
We are also persuaded by an argument raised in the 
amicus brief filed by a group of antitrust economists (“the 
Economists”).  That group explains why risk aversion makes 
it difficult to use the size of a settlement as a proxy for the 
brand-name’s likelihood of success in litigation: 
 
To explore why risk aversion could lead to the 
exchange of consideration having nothing to do 
with delayed entry, consider a lottery ticket with 
a 50% chance of a $0 payoff and a 50% chance 
of a $100 million payoff—i.e., the lottery ticket 
has an expected payoff of $50 million.  Most 
people holding such a ticket would be willing to 
accept less than the expected payoff amount to 
                                              
59 In the context of patent litigation, a launch is said to 
be “at-risk” if it takes place before the questions of 
infringement and validity are resolved, either through 
litigation or a license.  See In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 
837 F.3d at 244. 
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achieve certainty.  If a person would trade the 
aforementioned lottery ticket for a certain 
outcome of $20 million, he or she would 
essentially be willing to pay $30 million dollars 
to eliminate the risk of holding the lottery ticket 
that might result in the $0 payoff.  Accepting 
the certain outcome of $20 million dollars, 
however, does not reflect a belief that a $0 
payoff is anything more than [a] 50% [risk]. 
 
(Antitrust Economists Br. 11 (internal citation omitted).)  We 
think that reasoning serves as an effective rebuttal to the 
Appellants’ claim that the size of the reverse payment is a 
“surrogate” for the weakness of the ’708 patent. 
 
 The Appellants’ second argument relating to the 
litigation-based scenario relies on testimony provided by 
Martin Adelman, GSK’s expert.  Adelman estimated that 
Andrx had an 80% chance of prevailing with respect to 
infringement, a 50% chance of prevailing with respect to 
validity, and a 90% chance of prevailing with respect to 
inequitable conduct.60  Because Andrx would have to prevail 
with respect to all three issues in order to win the case, 
Adelman concluded that “Andrx had approximately a one out 
of three chance of winning the cases.”61  (JA 38717.)  
                                              
60 Adelman’s estimates and analysis are uncontested. 
 
61 The probability that Andrx would prevail on all 
three issues was calculated by multiplying the probability of 
success on each issue.  0.8*0.9*0.5=0.36, which is 
approximately 1/3. 
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However, in a bit of historical irony, it was Anchen’s founder 
and CEO who made the invention disclosed in the ’708 
patent, and he assigned his rights in it to Andrx.  Accordingly, 
it is highly likely that assignor estoppel would have prevented 
Anchen from arguing that the ’708 patent was invalid or that 
the patent was unenforceable because of inequitable 
conduct.62  Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., 
Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the 
doctrine of assignor estoppel and explaining that the doctrine 
“also prevents parties in privity with an estopped assignor 
from challenging the validity of the patent”); Shamrock 
Techs., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 793 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (same).  As a result, the only topic left for 
litigation would be whether Anchen infringed.  On that point, 
Adelman’s unrebutted analysis was that Andrx would have an 
                                              
62 “Assignor estoppel prevents a party who assigns a 
patent to another from later challenging the validity of the 
assigned patent.  This doctrine prevents the unfairness and 
injustice of permitting a party to sell something and later to 
assert that what was sold is worthless. ... [A]n assignment 
contains an implicit representation by the assignor that the 
patent rights that he is assigning ... are not worthless.”  
Mentor Graphics Corp., v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 
F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted); see Shamrock Techs., Inc. v. Med. 
Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(explaining assignor estoppel also applies to those who are in 
privity with the assignor).  Because the estoppel applies not 
only to the individual inventor but also to those in privity, 
Anchen itself, and not just its founder and CEO, would likely 
have been estopped. 
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80% chance of proving infringement – or, in other words, that 
Anchen would only have a 20% chance of winning the suit.63  
Neither the Appellants nor GSK identify any other evidence 
in the record that speaks to the possible outcomes of the 
Anchen-Andrx litigation.  On this record, then, no reasonable 
jury could conclude that Anchen would have been more likely 
than not to prevail. 
 
 Because both of the scenarios advanced by the 
Appellants fail to show that Anchen would have been able to 
launch its 150 mg version of Wellbutrin XL without running 
afoul of the Andrx patent, we conclude that the Appellants 
have also failed to show that their injuries were caused by the 
overall settlement.  Because the Appellants thus do not have 
antitrust standing, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.64  
                                              
63 The Appellants’ only response to that analysis is that 
GSK never moved for summary judgment on inventor 
estoppel and that Anchen had not raised the issue of assignor 
estoppel before it settled the case.  Even if those assertions 
are true, they do not show that Andrx would not have asserted 
the estoppel argument as the case progressed. 
 
64 Having concluded that the Appellants lack antitrust 
standing, we do not need to consider the District Court’s 
application of the rule of reason.  We note, however, that the 
rule of reason inquiry is fact intensive and is not easy to 
resolve at the summary judgment stage.  See Poller v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) 
(“[S]ummary procedures should be used sparingly in complex 
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, 
the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, 
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C. Class Certification, Daubert, and 
Intervention Issues 
 
Because we affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the merits, we need not address those 
other issues on appeal.65  Cf. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 
344 n.4 (1986) (“Because we reject the equal protection 
claim, we do not reach the class certification issue.”); Wilson 
v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“We do not reach the class certification issue raised by 
Wilson since we [will] affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
the complaint ... .”). 
 
                                                                                                     
and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”); W. Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 99 (describing the rule-of-reason as 
“fact intensive”); cf. King, 791 F.3d at 411 n.36 (describing 
the significance of fact finding in the rule of reason analysis). 
 
65 To recap, those issues are the decisions excluding 
the testimony of their economic expert and denying Aetna’s 
motion to intervene.  Additionally, the indirect-purchaser 
Appellants challenge the District Court orders decertifying 
the indirect-purchaser class and dismissing certain of the 
indirect purchasers’ claims for lack of standing.  Finally, GSK 
conditionally cross-appeals the Court’s certification of the 
direct-purchaser class as well as the Court’s conclusion that 
the indirect purchasers satisfy the predominance requirement 
of Rule 23. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
